Six principles
The first principle is that the fight against terrorism must continue until it is won. The cry we cant stop short has been interpreted simply as an expression of regret that the Gulf war campaign of George Bush Senior stopped short of toppling Saddam Hussein and a determination not to repeat that mistake.
It is however much more than that. It recognises that victory over terrorism is not achieved by occupying particular bits of real estate or crushing particular organisations, because new terror groups can and will spring up in different locations under different guises. What is declared is a campaign of rolling re-deployment against any group anywhere that threatens the use of terror to achieve its ends, as well as a sustained campaign against states that threaten with weapons of mass destruction.
The second principle is that, in order to deal with terrorism, a modification of the ancient principle of non-intervention by one country or the international community in the affairs of other countries is needed. It asserts that the prime responsibility for combating terrorism rests with those countries where terrorist organisations actually operate.
Thus, there will be no reason for the US or any other ally to intervene if countries take effective action against terrorist groups within their borders. However, the other side of the coin is an implicit offer of help where outside help is requested, as in the Philippines, and an implicit threat that there will be intervention if effective action is not taken.
Thirdly, when intervention is required, the Bush doctrine places the emphasis on action by coalitions of the willing and able. The statement that we will work closely with our coalition should be taken at face value as a preference for joint actions with other countries against terrorism, rather than for unilateral action. Before other countries jump to accuse the US of unilateralism, they are invited to ask themselves whether they are doing all they can to make joint action possible and effective.
Fourthly, it reaffirms the importance of deterrence as the best way to ensure peace and respect for international rules of good behaviour. By committing the United States to a missile defence shield and whatever else it takes to defend and strike against terrorism Bush has put terrorist organisations and rogue states on notice that the road to international blackmail is closed.
Fifthly, the Bush doctrine makes clear that military intervention is not the first choice for dissuading countries from backing terrorism with weapons of mass destruction. The emphasis on the denial of materials, technology and expertise maps an alternative strategy for international action.
Sixthly, when all else fails, the Bush doctrine reserves a first strike option. The fight against terrorism is not like the Cold War, where stalemate could be achieved through a posture of mutual assured destruction. Terrorist groups will be encouraged to act as long as they think that they can hit and run in ways and at times of their own choosing. The Bush doctrine denies them that tactical advantage.
Who is being simplistic?
The French Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine, is reported as saying that the Bush doctrine is simplistic. But if countries in Europe and elsewhere in the world wish to disagree with the Bush doctrine it is incumbent on them to offer an alternative set of principles for dealing with terrorism, and an alternative strategy.
French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin has elaborated the criticism voiced by his Foreign Minister by calling for a strategy that places less emphasis on a military response to terrorism and a more balanced approach to international rules and rule enforcement. By this he seems to mean that there must be more emphasis on reducing the causes of terrorism, for example by increasing development aid; and a more inclusive approach to defining threats to the global community by including, for example, the threat of environmental disasters. Similar remarks in favour of a broader strategy have been made by Joschka Fischer and Chris Patten.
Yet these criticisms are themselves simplistic. What has divided the American administration from sentiment in Europe about the environment is not a lack of shared concern about environmental threats but the lack of a common assessment of scientific knowledge about the environment, and a lack of common appreciation of what constitutes a proportionate and effective response to environmental problems.
Nor is there any easy link between terrorism and poverty. What arguably lies behind much global poverty and terrorism is a lack of democracy. And here lies the real problem. How tough a line should European countries and the United States take against undemocratic countries?
At the moment the US is making a Churchillian judgement about what constitutes the greater evil. (Criticised for lining up with Stalin against Hitler, Churchill is said to have responded that he would line up with the devil if necessary to defeat Hitler.) This means putting the fight against terrorism first even if it means finding allies among countries that are not democratic.
In the short term it is difficult to argue with that. For the longer term neither the US nor European countries have any easy answers about how to deal in their foreign policy, trade and aid policies with undemocratic regimes.
Three unworthy criticisms
In the absence of a more serious response to the substance of the Bush doctrine, one can identify three altogether unworthier motives behind the dismay expressed in Europe.
Firstly, the political will to stand up and say what the enforcement of international rules of behaviour means is largely absent. Above all, Europes leaders are not prepared to come clean with the public, and say that much higher levels of defence expenditure are needed for Europe to have an effective deterrent against terrorism and rogue regimes. They are leaving the enforcement of international rules of behaviour to the US and then turning round and criticising the US for unilateralism.
Secondly, too many of Europes leaders still think that they can do better through a policy of fudge and accommodation with terrorist groups and regimes. They assume that Europe is not as vulnerable to terror groups as the US and that Europe can strike its own deals with them. Far from the US being isolationist, some European politicians have a belief that Europe has some kind of immunity to evils beyond its borders and can practice a kind of isolationism of its own.
Thirdly, there is an unwillingness among Europes political leaders to acknowledge that in todays world it is flexible coalitions of the willing and able that are important for enforcing international rules of behaviour rather than the static, formalistic international organisations and alliances of the past.
While European countries are painfully constructing legalistic, treaty-bound common foreign, security and defence policies for themselves in the context of the EU, they do not seem to have noticed that this is not the way to achieve effective action in todays world. They are deceiving Europes public by promising the outward appearances of security but doing little to provide it in reality. Unless they change tack, Europes leaders are constructing an inflexible arrangement among the unwilling and the unable.
The shock and dismay expressed in Europe in response to the Bush doctrine is likely to come across to Americans as patronising and cynical and will encourage a go it alone mentality. Understandably, since far from reflecting a superior European moral sophistication, such expressions disguise a moral bankruptcy.
If countries outside the United States wish to disagree with the substance of the Bush doctrine they must come up with an alternative set of principles for upholding international rules of behaviour and an alternative strategy for enforcing them. Until Europes leaders can do this then their cries of dismay can be ignored as no more than cheap and dishonourable anti-Americanism. The eventual victims of such attitudes will not be Americans; they will be Europes own citizens.